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When Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) of 1975, the goal was to create 
mechanisms of tribal self-governance through the process of 
government contracting.1 By contracting funds to tribal 
governments used by federal agencies via the government contracts 
process, the federal government could turn over those funds to the 
tribal governments to manage contracted programs as they saw fit 
and thus provide tribes greater control over their socio-economic 
situation.2 On a number of metrics, ISDEAA is an enormous 
success. More than 60% of tribal programs are administered through 
self-governance contracting/compacting.3 Tribal self-governance 
contracting/compacting has significantly raised American Indian 
and Alaska Native (AI/AN) health outcomes, standards of living, 
                                                                                                             
* Ph.D. candidate, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2018; J.D., Georgetown 
University Law Center; M.A. in Political Science University of Wisconsin, May 
2012. 
1 FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 22.02 at 1386 (2012) 
[Hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK]. 
2  See President Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, H.R. Doc. 
No. 91-363, 1970. The Nixon Administration did not originate the idea of 
manipulating the government process is in this manner. The idea began with the 
Kennedy Administration in response to a document released by the National 
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) titled “Declaration of Indian Purpose” in 
1961, which decried the state of BIA controlled reservations and the lack of self-
determination for AI/AN governments. The Johnson Administration initiated a 
series of demonstration programs which the Nixon Administration then used a 
blueprint for ISDEAA. Telephone Interview with Eric Eberhard, Professor of 
Federal Indian Law at the University of Washington School of Law and former 
legal counsel to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Nov. 11, 2015). See 
further, THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND 
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, at 1961-1969 (2001). 
3 See U.S. Dep't of Interior, 2008 Annual Accountability Report (Sept. 2008); 
see further, U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), “Highlights” in INDIAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GAO-04-847 (Sept. 2004) available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243913.pdf. 
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and education rates across tribal backgrounds.4  However, whether 
ISDEAA empowers tribal sovereignty remains an open question—a 
question with important policy implications for tribal governments.5  
For example, tribal leadership in Tribal Budget Consultations 
with various federal agencies continually demand the full 
recognition of tribal sovereignty—recognition that federal agencies 
like the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health 
Service (IHS) continually elide by suggesting that ISDEAA 
contracting/compacting with the tribes is the same, or functionally 
equivalent to, the recognition of tribal sovereignty.6 Conflating tribal 
sovereignty with tribal compacting/contracting under ISDEAA not 
only ignores the demands of tribal leadership, but it also obscures 
the legal innovation at the heart of ISDEAA. 
This article charts the difference between the legal theories of 
tribal sovereignty and tribal self-governance 
contracting/compacting as argued for by tribal advocates. 
Conflating tribal self-governance contracting/compacting with 
tribal sovereignty ignores both the demands of tribal advocates and 
the legal history of tribal self-governance contracting/compacting.  I 
present three interlocking arguments: (1) that ISDEAA tribal self-
governance contracting/compacting was conceptualized and 
designed by tribal advocates to be a mechanism inside the American 
legal system, thus slightly removed from arguments on tribal 
sovereignty which tribal advocates argue stands outside the 
framework of United States Federal law; (2) that tribal self-
governance contracting/compacting was, and continues to be, a 
practical strategy on the part of tribal advocates to provide for the 
needs of their communities, while tribal sovereignty is an ideal for 
which they continue to fight; and, (3) that tribal self-governance 
contracting/compacting cannot be considered an act of tribal 
sovereignty unless such claims are understood in fundamentally 
different—and lesser—terms than demanded by tribal advocates. 7   
                                                                                                             
4 See JOSEPH P. KALT, ET. AL., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS 
UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, The Harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development (2008). 
5 See generally KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS OF U.S.-INDIGENOUS RELATIONS (2007). 
6  See President’s FY2017 Indian Country Budget: Hearing on S. 1392 Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Lawrence 
Roberts, Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs) (referring to tribal self-
governance contract/compacting as a recognition of “Tribal Nation-Building). 
7 But see supra note 5 (arguing that ISDEAA was part of the post-colonial re-
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Some tribal governments and organizations have remained 
skeptical of tribal self-governance contracting/compacting as a 
vehicle for meaningful tribal self-determination. These tribes argue 
that tribal self-governance contracting represents an abrogation of 
tribal treaty rights, and instead insist upon the direct federal 
provisioning of programs promised under treaty rights. These tribes 
are referred to within federal agency policy papers as “direct-service 
tribes.”8 Federal agencies argue that Ramah Navajo School Board 
Inc. v Babbitt 87.F3d 1338, a case against the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs for failure to pay the full contract support costs of Navajo 
Nation's education self-governance contract, demonstrate that tribal 
self-governance contracting has the double effect of removing the 
federal treaty responsibility while at the same time shifting the 
burden of those treaty obligations onto the tribes themselves.9 These 
tribes insist upon the fulfillment of the treaties between their 
individual tribes and the United States government on the grounds 
that anything else ignores their sovereignty as tribal nations. The 
Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association has continually insisted 
upon the observation of treaty rights before tribal self-governance 
                                                                                                             
conceptualization of tribal sovereignty within the colonial bounds of US federal 
law. He further argues that tribal exercise of self-governance 
contracting/compacting constitutes as “third space of sovereignty.”); but see 
further, Rebecca Tsosie & William Coffey, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty 
Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 191 (2001) (locating tribal self-governance 
contracting within a general legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty and arguing for 
its use to develop a culturally grounded theory of tribal sovereignty). 
8 The BIA and IHS refer to these tribes as “direct-service” because the BIA and 
IHS provide services directly to the tribes opposed to forming self-determination 
contracts or compacts under ISDEAA with them. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE CIRCULAR NO. 2005-03, DIRECT 
SERVICE TRIBES ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHARTER (2005) available at 
https://www.ihs.gov/ihm/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_circ_main&circ=ihm_cir
c_0503.  
9 The Ramah line of cases are an important piece of case law for tribal self-
governance contracting/compacting revolving around federal government 
obligations to pay full contract support costs in ISDEAA contracts. The Ramah 
cases were recently settled for $940 million after the Supreme Court ruled for 
Navajo Nation in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, finding that the agencies 
must pay full support costs even if Congress had not appropriated those costs. 
The settlement was finalized January 20, 2016; thus, the full impact of that 
settlement remains unclear (see Ramah Settlement Funds Finally Released by 
Obama Administration, INDIANZ (August 11, 2016); Interior, Justice 
Departments Announce $940 Million Landmark Settlement with Nationwide 
Class of Tribes and Tribal Entities, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (September 17, 
2015); Renee Lewis, Feds to Pay $940 to Settle Claims over Tribal Contracts, 
AL JAZEERA (September 17, 2015). 
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contracting/compacting in United States funding and legislative 
priorities.10 This power - inequality, they argue- not only makes the 
concept of tribal sovereignty through tribal self-governance 
contracting/compacting inherently flawed, but is also deeply 
insulting to the dignity of tribal nations. 
Other tribal governments, most prominently Navajo Nation and 
Jamestown S'Klallam, argue that while the legal theory and 
execution of tribal self-governance contracting/compacting are not 
ideal, the use of government contracting has been the most 
successful legal mechanism for the preservation of tribal self-
determination rights to date.11   Self-governance tribes point to new 
methods of enforcing federal tribal consultation provisions, the 
ability to tailor programs for tribal needs, and the general increase 
in living standards for AI/AN peoples. White papers released by 
Self-Governance Communication and Education (SGCE)—a tribal 
think-tank on self-governance issues— make similar criticisms as 
the ones made by the Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association, 
but argue that tribal self-governance contracting remains the best 
current mechanism for tribal-federal negotiations.12 The Papers also 
distinguish tribal self-governance contracting from tribal 
sovereignty, but argue as a practical matter expanding ISDEAA 
contracting/compacting must guide federal funding priorities.13  
                                                                                                             
10 The Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association (GPTCA) is an organization 
formed by the tribal leadership of South and North Dakota, Montana, Nebraska, 
and Iowa. GPTCA represent the leadership of the largest proportion of ‘direct-
service’ tribes in the country. GPTCA provides member tribes with lobbying, 
policy, and legal support; see United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
Oversight Hearing: “Youth Suicide in Indian Country” Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Robert Moore, Rosebud 
Sioux Tribal Chairman); United States Cong. House Subcommittee on Interior, 
Environment, and Related Agencies, American Indian and Alaska Native Public 
Witness Hearings on the Fiscal Year 2017, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of 
John Yellow Bird Steele, Chairman of Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s 
Association). 
11 Telephone Interview with Jim Roberts, Senior Policy Analysis, Portland Area 
Health Board (Dec. 11, 2015).  
12 See 2017-2019 National Tribal Self-Governance Strategic Plan, TRIBAL SELF 
GOVERNANCE COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION CONSORTIUM, at 3, 
http://www.tribalselfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/17-19-SG-Strategic-
Plan-online.pdf. The Self-Governance Communication and Education 
organization is a non-profit organization that provides policy and technical 
expertise to tribes who have, or are interested in entering into, ISDEAA self-
determination contracts/compacts. The group undertakes limited lobbying work 
and operates predominantly as the policy think-tank on tribal self-determination 
contracting. See generally, http://self-gov.org. 
13 Id.; see further, TSG Legislative Priorities for the 115th Congress, presented at 
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Thus, tribal advocates are split between those who demand tribal 
sovereignty and those who demand better and expanded 
opportunities for tribal self-governance contracting. Or at least, this 
dichotomy is the vision of intra-tribal politics that one gets reading 
the policy papers from federal agencies. The reality of the situation 
is more complex. Tribal governments struggle between the need to 
solve the pressing problems facing their communities and the need 
to continue to fight for the sovereign rights of their individual 
nations. The federal agencies present a false dichotomy regarding 
tribal politics and tribal choices—either a tribe accepts tribal 
contracting/compacting as it stands with no contestation, or a tribe 
has chosen to continue to fight for the full recognition of their 
sovereignty and treaty rights.14 As a political reality, the divide 
between 'direct-service tribes' and 'self-governance tribes' in terms 
of concrete political action is not nearly so great as presented by 
federal agencies.15 Nearly all tribes capable of entering into a self-
governance contract/compact have done so for at least one or more 
service or program previously administered by a federal agency. All 
tribes struggle for the full recognition of their sovereign rights. The 
idea that a tribe is either a 'self-governance tribe' – and thus 
uncritically embraces ISDEAA–or is a 'direct service tribe' – and 
thus rejects ISDEAA in favor of the ideal of substantive 
sovereignty–is an oversimplification of AI/AN political reality. 
Moreover, this either/or between ISDEAA or sovereignty both 
obscures and, at the same time, perpetuates the assumption that self-
governance contracting/compacting is an act of sovereignty. 
                                                                                                             
2016 Tribal Self-Governance Annual Consultation Conference April 24, 2016; 
see also, ACA/TSGAC Contract Support Costs and Other Current Topics 
Webinar, November 11, 2016. 
14 This dichotomy is evident in the way the BIA and IHS divide their approach 
between “self-governance tribes” (meaning those tribes that engage in 638 
contracting), and “direct-service tribes” (meaning those tribes that have not 
engaged 638 contracting). The distinction is a false one after a little bit of 
consideration because almost every tribe has entered at least one Title I, 638 
contract or compact, but it is a division that both BIA and IHS reiterate in almost 
every Tribal Budget Consultation and within their agency handbooks. 
15 A common explanation deployed by both IHS and BIA for budget choices, the 
lack of transparency with the development of budget documents, and for 
problems around paying full contract support costs tends to be a “divide within 
the Indian community” on budget priorities. See, The President’s Fiscal year 
2013 Budget for Native Programs, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th 
Cong. 2 (2012) (testimony of Yvette Roubideaux, director of Indian Health 
Service); see also, The President’s Fiscal year 2014 Budget for Native 
Programs, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2013) (testimony 
of Yvette Roubideaux, director of the Indian Health Service).  
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The debate around ISDEAA and its problems often centers 
around tribal self-governance contracting as a sovereignty 
mechanism. Understanding the difference between self-
determination, self-governance and sovereignty is critical for 
advocating effectively for tribal interests. Arguing for better and 
more effective tribal contracts/compacts is not the same as 
advocating for the sovereignty rights of tribes; moreover, advocating 
for improvements to ISDEAA and tribal self-governance does not 
preclude indigenous activists from working towards substantive 
sovereignty for tribal communities. 
Section two of this article provides a brief history of federal 
Indian policy and its approach towards tribal sovereignty. Federal 
Indian policy has changed radically multiple times over the course 
of United States history and the development of key concepts are 
often poorly understood—even by those tasked with its 
implementation.16 Understanding how federal Indian policy has 
developed is critical to understanding the current legal reality for 
tribal governments. Building from that base, I argue in section three 
that ISDEAA and '638-ing'17 are the foundation upon which modern 
tribal self-determination and self-governance is understood within 
the United States. In section four, I argue that tribal self-governance 
contracts cannot be considered expressions of tribal sovereignty, nor 
can they be considered a viable foundation for developing a legal 
framework of tribal sovereignty. I conclude by arguing that even 
with its problems and shortcomings, tribal self-governance 
contracting/compacting are vital parts of the legal framework 
protecting AI/AN communities and worth pursuing for tribal 
communities. I argue that substantive sovereignty for tribal 
communities cannot exist within the framework of United States 
law, but must exist as an exception to Congressional plenary powers; 
however, tribal self-governance and self-determination rights can 
exist within the framework of United States law.     
 
                                                                                                             
16 See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 189-205 (2005) (describing ISDEAA as part of the turning point for 
tribal self-determination, but also explaining difficulty educating non-Indians on 
its application and meaning).  
17 The process of entering into a tribal self-governance contract/compact is 
commonly referred to as '638-ing' a service, program, or facility—such as a 
hospital or clinic—after ISDEAA's public law number: Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 
Stat. 2203 (1975). 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IN UNITED 
STATES FEDERAL LAW 
 
A. The Marshall Court Sets the Frame: “Domestic, Dependent 
Nations” 
 
The idea of tribal sovereignty has a complicated history within 
United States Federal law. Tribes have existed half inside and half 
outside the framework of United States Federal law since the 
founding of the country. As “domestic dependent nations”, tribal 
governments have a right, in legal theory, to govern themselves 
within their own boundaries since time immemorial and without 
interference from the state or federal government. In practice, the 
continued existence of tribes, their governments, and their lands 
exists upon the sufferance of the United States Congress under the 
plenary power doctrine.18  That is, the “Congress has the plenary 
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the tribes otherwise possess.”19 While legal 
scholars have critiqued the plenary powers doctrine, the doctrine has 
since evolved from the court's understanding that tribal sovereignty 
must be limited such that they cannot “conflict with the interest of 
the overriding sovereignty” of the United States.20 The sovereign 
rights of tribal governments have been conditional since Worcester 
v Georgia,21 where the Marshall Court held that:  
 
The Indian nations have always been considered as 
distinct, independent political communities retaining 
their original natural rights as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with 
the single exception of that imposed by irresistible 
power, which excluded them from intercourse with 
any other European potentate than the first 
discoverer of the coast of the particular region 
                                                                                                             
18 See STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 83-84 (2012); VINE 
DELORIA & CLIFFORD LITTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983). 
19 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1673(1978). 
20 Id. at 56; see further VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LITTLE, TRIBES, TREATIES 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999); see also Robert A. Williams, 
Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 441 
(1988) (extensively critiquing the Court's theory of tribal sovereignty in general 
and the plenary powers doctrine in particular as “racist, eurocentric, and 
genocidal”); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209, S. 
Ct. 1011 (1978). 
21 31 U.S. 515, 521 (1832). 
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claimed, and this was a restriction which those 
European potentates imposed upon themselves, as 
well as themselves. The very term “nation,” so 
generally applied to them, means “a people distinct 
from others.” The Constitution, by declaring treaties 
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the 
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned 
the previous treaties with the Indian nations and 
consequently admits their rank among those powers 
who are capable of making treaties. The words 
“treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language, 
selected in our diplomatic and legislative 
proceedings by ourselves, having each a definite and 
well understood meaning. We have applied them to 
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations 
of the earth.  
 
Despite finding that the Indian nations were the same as “other 
nations of the earth,” the Marshall Court held back from recognizing 
them as equal to European nations and maintained the holding of 
Cherokee Nation v Georgia.22 The Court in Cherokee Nation v 
Georgia found that Indian nations required the protection of the 
federal government—protection from other European nations or, as 
in Worcester, from the states. The Marshall Court's holding created 
an insecure framework where Indian tribes were, in theory, free from 
the laws of both state and federal governments except for specific 
treaties made with them—but that only the United States had the 
right to make such treaties.23 Indian tribes embodied a removed 
sovereignty, one lesser in statute than that of Western nation-states. 
Tribal sovereignty, even in the formulation of a sympathetic 
Marshall Court, was still a separate and lesser category. However, 
the Court maintained throughout the Cherokee cases that only the 
                                                                                                             
22 30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831). 
23 Justice Marshall's doctrine of domestic dependent nations was in line with the 
prevailing theory of “trusteeship” for non-European peoples that was popular 
throughout the late nineteenth century. James Lorimer, a noted international law 
scholar of the nineteenth century, argued “the right of undeveloped races, like 
the right of undeveloped individuals, is a right not to recognition as what they 
are not, but to guardianship, that is guidance—in becoming that, of which they 
are capable, and in realizing their special ideals.” JAMES LORIMER, THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF THE JURAL RELATIONS OF 
SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES AT 157 (1883-1884). Justice Marshall's 
holding in Worcester v Cherokee follows this line of legal reasoning and thus 
sets tribal sovereignty from the beginning at a diminished status within the 
American legal system.   
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federal government itself could interfere with Indian tribes through 
treaty—hypothetically maintaining the sovereignty of Indian 
nations.24 Whether the Court was protecting the plenary powers of 
Congress to deal with the tribes as it saw fit, or extending at least 
some measure of respect for the sovereignty of the tribes is a matter 
of ongoing legal argument.25 
 
B. Ending the Treaties: The Allotment and Assimilation Era 
1871-1928 
 
The shift between treaty-making between the United States and 
the tribes and near-unilateral federal policy on the tribes—federal 
policy focused forced assimilation culminating in the Dawes Act—
began shortly after the dust settled around the newly created federal 
institutions. Treaties between the United States and various tribes 
have guaranteed tribal control over lands, resources, and cultural 
practices since the founding of the country. Unfortunately, treaty 
promises have rarely been worth the paper they were written upon. 
A steady erosion of tribal lands resulting from war, questionable 
treaty negotiations, aggressive Congressional action against tribal 
interests and the willful ignorance of Supreme Court decisions have 
characterized federal-Indian relationships such that any actual 
sovereign rights of Indian tribes were recognized only within the 
courtroom and rarely outside it.  
Once allotment began, the concept of tribal sovereignty - as 
limited and stunted as it was within United States constitutional law 
- became a complete legal fiction not even recognized in federal 
legislation. The allotment and assimilation period of federal Indian 
policy from 1871 to 1928 began with an unassuming congressional 
budget rider stating:  
 
That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the 
                                                                                                             
24 I say hypothetically because Worcester v Cherokee is also the case that proves 
the fragility of Supreme Court cases because the cases where Andrew Jackson 
publicly declared that the Court ought not “be permitted to control the Congress, 
or the Executive.” The history of federal-Indian cases has been marked by a 
tendency of federal agencies to ignore the rulings of the courts in favor of 
abrogating tribal sovereignty. JILL NOGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: TWO 
LANDMARK CASES IN THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AT 122-124 (2007). 
25 The Court's holding in Worcester has been cited in both cases that uphold the 
inviolability of tribal sovereignty, as in United States v Long, 324 F.3d 475 (7th 
Cir), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 822 (2003) and in cases which asserted their 
dependency and secondary status as in Oliphant. 
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territory of the United States shall be acknowledged 
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or 
power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty: Provided further, That nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair 
the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made 
and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.26  
 
A brief two-line rider upon a budget bill effectively ended any 
federal recognition of tribal sovereignty as a continuing legal 
doctrine, and instead turned the tribes into “the Indian problem” to 
be solved via federal programs to hasten their “civilization and 
assimilation”.27 The General Allotment Act of 1887 was designed to 
force tribes to participate fully in the American legal system via the 
granting of individual property deeds.28 Assimilationist reformers of 
federal Indian policy sought to develop programs that would ensure 
the erasure of tribal communities, governments, and cultures 
through establishment of agencies like the Courts of Indian 
Offenses.29  
In the face of federal policies determined to end their existence, 
tribal governments continued to insist upon their sovereignty and 
rights of self-determination. Even as the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
was created, not to work with Indian tribes, but to manage their 
assimilation, tribal leadership petitioned the federal government for 
recognition of status as sovereign nations. As Robert Yellowtail, a 
tribal leader from the Crow Tribe of Montana, stated before the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in 1919: 
 
Mr. Chairman, it is peculiar and strange to me, 
however, that after such elaborate and distinct 
understandings [referring to treaties of 1880, 1882, 
and 1904] it should develop that to-day, after over 
half a century since our agreement, you have not 
upon your statute books nor in your archives of law, 
so far as I know, one law that permits us to think free, 
act free, expand free, and to decide free without first 
                                                                                                             
26 Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871 Ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)). 
27 See FREDERICK F. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE 
THE INDIANS 1880-1934 (1984) 
28 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 71-72. 
29 See WILLIAM HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN 
ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL 135-138 (1966). 
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having to go and ask a total stranger that you call the 
Secretary of the Interior, in all humbleness and 
humiliation, “How about this, Mr. Secretary, can I 
have permission to do this?” and “Can I have 
permission to do that”? Etc. Ah, Mr. Chairman, if you 
had given us an inkling then what has since 
transpired, I am sure that our fathers would have then 
held their ground until every one of them were dead 
or until you saw fit to guarantee to us in more explicit 
assurances something more humane, something 
more of that blessing of civil life, peculiar to this 
country alone that you call “Americanism.” 
Mr. Chairman, you President [Woodrow Wilson] 
but yesterday assured the people of this great country 
and also the people of the whole world, that the right 
of self-determination shall not be denied to any 
people, no matter where they live, no matter how 
small or weak they may be, nor what their previous 
conditions of servitude may have been. He has stood 
before the whole world for the past three years at 
least as the champion of the rights of humanity and 
of the cause of the weak and dependent peoples of 
this earth. He has told us that this so-called league of 
nations was conceived for the express purpose of 
lifting from the shoulder the burdened humanity this 
unnecessary load of care. If that be the case, Mr. 
Chairman, I shall deem it my most immediate duty 
to see that every Indian in the United States shall do 
what he can for the speedy passage of that measure, 
but on the other hand, Mr. Chairman, this thought has 
often occurred to me, that perhaps the case of the 
North American Indians may never have entered the 
mind of our great President when he uttered those 
solemn words; that, perhaps, in the final draft of this 
league of nations document a proviso might have 
been inserted to read something like this: That in no 
case shall this be construed to mean that the Indians 
of the United States shall be entitled to the rights and 
privileged expressed herein, or the right of self-
determination, as it is understood herein, but that 
their freedom and future shall be left subject to such 
rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior 
may, in his discretion, prescribe.30 
                                                                                                             
30 The Allotment of Lands of the Crow Indians in Montana, Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, S. Rep. No. 19, 1919, 66th Cong. 1 (testimony of Robert 
Yellowtail of the Crow Tribe of Montana) (Mr. Yellowtail was not a trained 
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The rest of Robert Yellowtail's testimony goes on to explain that the 
Crow Tribe was, in accordance to both United States legal theory 
and by treaty, a sovereign nation and thus entitled to the rights of 
self-governance and self-determination as proclaimed by the League 
of Nations. His advocacy was both spirited and legally grounded. It 
was also unsuccessful. Allotment came to the Crow Tribe of 
Montana over their objections and stripped the tribe of nearly half 
of their lands.31 Despite clear understanding of the governing legal 
theories of self-governance, self-determination, and sovereignty as 
they were understood not only within the United States, but also on 
the international stage, Mr. Yellowtail was unable to convince the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to apply those same principles 
to his tribe. The refusal of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
to apply the concept of sovereignty in its fullness to the Crow Tribe 
marked not a divergence from federal Indian law, but a fulfillment 
of it. From the Marshall Court forward, United States federal law 
steadily diminished the conception of tribal sovereignty to subsume 
tribal governance into the general United States legal framework. 
Mr. Yellowtail's testimony is just one more moment in a history 
where AI/AN governments are set aside as not really participating 
in the same legal conceptions of self-rule applied to other 
governments—whether state or federal. In the mind of the allotment 
and assimilation era Congress, tribal sovereignty—the tribes 
themselves— were a problem within United States federal law to be 
solved, rather than a promise to be fulfilled.32  
 
C. The Indian Reorganization Act: A Brief Reprieve for Tribes 
 
Mr. Yellowtail's testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs occurred in the middle period of federal Indian policy; 
in fact, it was nearly a decade before federal Indian policy would 
once again shift, this time towards a measure of respect for tribal 
governments as governments. Congress first attempted to create 
what Robert Yellowtail had noted as missing throughout the history 
                                                                                                             
attorney, but rather an elected leader of the Crow Tribe).  
31 See FREDRICK E HOXIE, TALKING BACK TO CIVILIZATION: INDIAN VOICES 
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 136-138 (2001) (discussing the aftermath of Robert 
Yellowtail’s testimony before Congress).  
32 See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 63-64 (2005) (describing development of the philosophies guiding the 
Congressional policy of allotment and assimilation). 
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of federal Indian law: a law upon the books which allowed tribal 
governments some modicum of self-governance through the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). The text of the IRA explicitly 
denied the sovereignty of tribal governments, and instead the Senate 
Report on the bill referred to the Supreme Court language of 
“domestic dependent nations” instead. The IRA was not even a 
vehicle of self-determination for tribal governments as it was based 
upon the (in)famous Meriam Report – which, despite underscoring 
the need for reforming the BIA, continued to refer to AI/AN 
communities as “the Indian Problem” and argued that eventually all 
AI/AN communities would be fully assimilated into the majority 
body politic.33 Moreover, this assimilation was an unqualified good: 
“The national government can expedite the transition and hasten the 
day when there will no longer be a distinctive Indian Problem and 
when the necessary governmental services are rendered alike to 
whites and Indians by the same organization without 
discrimination.”34 Tribal sovereignty was never the goal of the IRA, 
because that would have permanently set apart tribal communities 
and make full assimilation an impossibility, but tribal self-
governance was something allowable within the framework of 
United States law.  
The IRA did three critical things for the development of tribal 
self-governance. First, it put an end to allotment and the shattering 
of Indian lands. Second, it allowed tribal lands to either be held 'in 
trust' by the federal government or to be reclaimed by tribal 
governments. Finally, it created provisions for tribal communities to 
develop federally recognized constitutions as implements of self-
governance.35 Despite a string of Supreme Court cases recognizing 
the nominal rights to sovereignty and self-governance of Indian 
tribes, federal Indian policy until 1928 could only be categorized as 
paternalistic and assimilationist.36 The IRA was an attempt to walk 
                                                                                                             
33 See HOXIE, supra note 31; Wilkinson, supra note 32; see further American 
Indian Policy Review Commission, A Policy for the Future, FINAL REPORT 
(1977). 
34 Lewis Meriam et al., Institute for Government Research, The Problem of 
Indian Administration, THE MERIAM COMMISSION (1928). 
35 See WILKINSON, supra note 32. 
36 The American Indian Policy Review Commission of 1977 found that federal 
Indian policy more often than not worked in complete opposition to Supreme 
Court rulings. One of the main legal recommendations of the Commission was 
that a federal agency be created with the explicit task of ensuring that federal 
Indian policy remain compliant with both the trust responsibility and 
constitutional law. See American Indian Policy Review Commission, A Policy 
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the line between the assimilationist hopes of federal Indian policy 
up until that point and the line of Supreme Court cases since 
Worcester v Georgia in 1832, recognizing at the very least the self-
governance rights of Indian tribes. The Indian Reorganization Act 
was still a piece of paternalistic legislation, but it was the first piece 
of federal legislation that recognized the self-governance capacity 
of tribal governments.37 Tribal sovereignty was still a bridge too far, 
but tribal governments saw the potential for at least some form of 
recognition under the IRA and tried to push that potential. 
The IRA can be seen as the first moment where federal Indian 
policy embraced a theory of legal pluralism that incorporated tribal 
governance into the American legal framework.38 The IRA was 
intensely controversial both within the federal agencies and among 
tribal governments.39 Those in the agencies were resistant to giving 
up the assimilation ideals of the allotment period, and tribal 
governments objected to the continuing requirement that the BIA 
approve in writing any decision a tribal government might make.40 
The IRA period was, unfortunately, just a brief respite from the 
federal attacks on tribal governments. The end of World War II saw 
the beginning of the termination and relocation era of federal Indian 
policy, which have been the most destructive series of federal 
policies for Indian communities since the founding of the nation.41 
 
D. Termination and Relocation: The Threat of Annihilation 
 
The termination and relocation era (1943-1965) was heralded by 
the release of the Survey of Conditions Among the Indians of the 
United States, reporting results of a 15-year study on the status of 
                                                                                                             
for the Future, FINAL REPORT (1977). 
37  See Hoxie, supra note 31, at 30; see further, ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL 
TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN 
REORGANIZATION ACT 177-187 (2000). 
38 See generally, DALIA T. MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX COHEN AND 
THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (Cornell University Press, ed. 
2007) (discussing the development of Felix Cohen's political philosophy and 
theory of Indian law during and after the Indian Reorganization period).  
39  Id.; see further, THEODORE H. HAAS, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 
UNDER THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT (1947) (detailing the concerns and 
reservations within the federal agencies and their accusations of tribal 
intransience towards full implementation of the IRA). 
40 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 81. 
41  Id. at 84-93; see further, ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 349 (1970). 
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Indian people.42 The initial report was a complete rejection of any 
theory of tribal sovereignty.43 It rejected the IRA approach to the 
status and management of Indian lands. It rejected a pluralistic 
vision of United States federal law that included tribal governments. 
It further rejected the entire concept of tribal constitutions as a 
fundamental threat to United States sovereignty. The report found 
that Indian people lived in poverty, were unable to access the 
benefits of the New Deal, and that jurisdictional issues prohibited 
the economic development of Indian lands.44 It recommended 
ending the federal-tribal trust relationship developed under the IRA 
in favor of the complete assimilation of Indian people.45 The 1944 
Mundt Report, developed by the House Committee on Indian 
Affairs, reiterated these findings and recommended expedited 
assimilation. 46 “Termination” was chosen over the more ominous 
“liquidation,” but the final results were the same.  
Throughout the 1940s, proposals were introduced to eliminate, 
reduce, or substantially modify the IRA. Some of these changes 
appeared to increase tribal self-governance as they extended the IRA 
credit programs to all tribes beyond the original demonstration 
programs; however, these proposals formed with the ultimate end of 
terminating the federal-tribal relationship and ending any legal 
pluralism formed under the IRA.47 Concurrent with these policies, 
the BIA initiated the “Voluntary Relocation Program,” which was 
aimed at relocating service-age American Indians and Alaska 
                                                                                                             
42 Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Analysis of the 
Statement of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Justification of 
Appropriations of 1944, and the Liquidation of the Indian Bureau, S. Rep. No 
78-310 (1943); S. Supp. Rep. 78-310 (1944) (hereinafter Survey of Conditions). 
43 Id. at 36; see further, COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 85; TYLER 
LYMAN, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 151-186 (1973). 
44 Survey of Conditions, supra note 42; see generally, DONALD FIXICO, 
TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1986) 
(discussing the legislative history of the termination and relocation policies post-
WWII). 
45 Survey of Conditions, supra note 42. 
46 See Investigate Indian Affairs: On H. Res. 166 (A Bill to Authorize and Direct 
and Conduct an Investigation to Determine Whether the Changed Status of the 
Indian Requires a Revision of the Laws and Regulations Affecting the American 
Indian), 78th Cong. 1 and 2 (1943) [hereinafter H. Res 166 Hearings]. If any of 
the members of the Committee found their choice of language alarmingly 
similar to Nazi rhetoric regarding ‘the Jewish problem,’ it is not reflected in the 
Congressional Record. 
47 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 87; see also, Comm'n on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of Govt., Indian Affairs: A Report to 
Congress, H.R. DOC. NO 81-1 (1949). 
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Natives returning from the war.48 Tribes faced programs that sought 
to remove their lands from federal trust status, and placing them up 
for sale to the general public on the one hand, and the relocation of 
their members on the other. House Resolution 82-2503 of 1952 was 
the capstone of termination and relocation.49 The resolution directed 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to conduct a complete 
oversight investigation into BIA and IHS responsibilities to 
formulate proposals “designed to promote the earliest practical 
termination of all federal supervision and control over Indians.”50  
Termination policies devastated tribal communities. They ended 
federal programs for both tribes and individuals, introduced state 
and local legislative jurisdiction over traditional tribal lands and 
communities, and ended federal trusteeship over tribal and 
individual lands. Most small tribes lost their entire landholdings in 
short sales not designed to maximize Indian value placed in the 
land.51 With the termination of the federal-tribal relationship, the 
sale of tribal lands, and an end to Indian programs, many tribal 
governments became increasingly dysfunctional and were unable to 
exercise what few self-governance rights were left to them. In 1953, 
Congress further complicated tribal self-governance capacity with 
Public Law 280 (PL 280), which transferred criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over some Indian lands to state governments that elected 
to assume such responsibilities.52 The federal policies of the 
termination and relocation era sought not just to extinguish what 
lingering concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-governance that 
might remain within United States federal Indian law, but to also 





                                                                                                             
48 Comm'r Ind. Aff., Ann. Rep. (1954), excerpted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED 
STATES INDIAN POLICY 238 (Francis Paul Prucha, 3rd ed., University of Nebraska 
Press). 
49 H.R. REP. NO. 82-2503 (1952).  
50 Id. 
51 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 89-90.  
52 Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (§ 7 repealed and reenacted as 
amended 1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C §§ 1321-
1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 1360 note) PL 280 only provided for the mandatory 
transfer of jurisdiction in five states: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin. Alaska was added in 1958. 
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III. ISDEAA: 638-ING FOR SURVIVAL AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
A. The Kennedy & Johnson Administrations: Testing the 
Government Contracts Frame 
 
In the late 1960s, against the backdrop of tribes losing their 
federal recognition—and thus their lands, self-governance rights, 
and members—tribal leaders launched an advocacy campaign that 
was both desperate and bold. The American Indian Movement 
(AIM) has been characterized as the “last great Indian battle,” and it 
was certainly seen that way by the tribal advocates involved.53 As 
Vine Deloria said at the time: “If we lose this one, there might not 
be another.”54 With the very concept of Indian existence at stake, 
tribal advocates worked to counter, not just the specific termination 
and relocation policies destroying their communities, but also the 
underlying philosophies motivating said policies. AIM’s 
fundamental goal in their legislative activism was not to return to a 
mystical past in the federal-Indian relationship where tribal 
sovereignty was respected.55 Instead, AIM leaders sought to re-
imagine the entire federal-tribal relationship from the ground up.56 
Tribal advocates knew they had to change the language used by both 
the federal agencies and within their own documents.57 Although 
tribal leadership began to use the language of self-governance and 
self-determination in the context of federal law, they never 
abandoned their demands for tribal sovereignty. They just 
foregrounded the need for self-governance in a deliberate strategy 
to gain allies.58 
As the history described in section two demonstrates, federal 
                                                                                                             
53 MARK TRAHANT, THE LAST GREAT BATTLE OF THE INDIAN WARS viii-xv 
(2010).  
54 See Deloria and Little, supra note 18, at 111. Mr. Deloria was a noted Native 
American political theorist and philosopher who developed the bulk of the 
political and policy reasoning behind AIM. His work continues to be a major 
touchstone for scholars working on indigenous rights issues. 
55 See VINE DELORIA & DAVID E WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, & 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS vii-xi (1999) (dismantling the idea that tribes 
were ever viewed as sovereign equals). 
56 See VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984). 
57 See id. at 190-192 (describing the tribal strategy of using the language of self-
determination to shift federal agency perceptions).  
58 See generally, VINE DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN 
MANIFESTO (1966) (arguing for a restructuring of the federal-tribal relationship). 
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Indian law never had a legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty that 
respected the full self-governance capacity of tribes. Tribal leaders 
advocated for the recognition of Indian sovereignty rights and 
articulated perfectly workable legal theories supporting tribal 
sovereignty in nearly every hearing before Congress that they were 
permitted to attend; but a doctrine of substantive tribal sovereignty 
never materialized within federal statute and steadily disappeared, 
even within case law. The American Indian Policy Review 
Commission found that “there is substantial controversy 
surrounding the concept of tribal sovereignty and the exercise of 
governmental authority by the tribes within their reservation.”59 
Further, they believed that the trend of federal court decisions “has 
favored the tribes in their efforts to achieve good government within 
the reservations.”60 However, even their hopeful analysis of the 
court decisions found that tribes were forced to accept 
“qualifications upon their sovereignty—such as extraterritorial 
court jurisdiction—for the sake of receiving United States 
protection, they relied upon remedies of small practical use.”61 The 
American Indian Policy Review Commission further found that 
even court support of tribal sovereignty ended with the 1871 
congressional budget rider ending treaty-making with tribes.62 
Faced with this legal reality, tribal leaders and their allies had to find 
a different legal framework to support the self-governance and self-
determination rights of tribal nations. They found it within the 
relatively obscure provisions of government contracting. 
One of the continuing critiques of federal Indian policy by tribal 
leaders was their inability to manage their own lands, resources, and 
programs. Any meaningful decision a tribe wanted to make had to 
be approved, in writing, by the BIA.63 Thus, the goal of most tribal 
                                                                                                             
59 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N., FINAL REPORT 4 (1977). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 54. 
62 Id. at 59. The Commission, however, does not discuss the Kagama or Lone 
Wolf decisions which upheld congressional acts encroaching upon the self-
governance rights of tribes and effectively undermining the force of the 
Cherokee line of cases. See also, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act of 1885 which 
removed tribal jurisdiction over major crimes between AI/AN peoples on tribal 
lands to federal court, effectively ending tribal court jurisdiction); Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (affirming the ability of Congress to unilaterally 
abrogate treat provisions as part of the congressional plenary powers, thus 
placing such abrogation beyond judicial review). 
63 “They [BIA officials] would sit in on any and all tribal meetings they felt like. 
Anything that spent more than, say, 200 dollars, had to be approved by them. 
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leaders was finding a way of wresting substantive decision-making 
power and control—particularly over financial decisions—from the 
federal agencies. Tribal leaders found that insisting upon the 
sovereignty of Indian nations over their own lands and peoples was 
not a tactic that provided concrete solutions to the problems facing 
their communities; thus, they began to look for alternative methods 
to achieve their goal.64 The fundamental problem with trying to 
resolve the problems of control over programs, funding, and land, 
revolved around the fact that federal law trumped tribal jurisdiction 
even in the most generous of Supreme Court rulings.65 Tribal leaders 
realized that they had to find a way of gaining control within the 
legal framework of the United States if they were to limit 
interference from the federal agencies.66  
Until ISDEAA, the attempts by tribal leaders to retain, or regain, 
control over tribal lands and governance had come through 
arguments of tribal sovereignty—that as sovereign nations they had 
the right to govern their territories without interference. After the 
Kagama and Lone Wolf decisions, which upheld the plenary power 
of Congress to make unilateral decisions regarding tribes and their 
lands, sovereignty arguments looked fragile.67 Rather than retread 
the path of the Indian Reorganization Act and try again to regain 
control via a framework of secondary sovereignty within that of the 
United States—a path that left tribes vulnerable to the whims of 
Congress—tribal advocates argued that it was time to make United 
                                                                                                             
Anything they didn't like 'went against the handbook' [referring to the BIA 
Manual], which was kept in a vault so we could never see the damned thing. 
That entire system had to go, Navajo leadership decided. It wasn't tenable.” 
Telephone Interview with Eric Eberhard, Professor of Federal Indian Law at the 
University of Washington School of Law and former legal counsel to the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs (Dec. 9, 2015) (explaining the pre-ISDEAA 
process of tribal decision-making and BIA interference with tribal governance); 
See also, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973) (ordering the BIA to make 
accessible BIA manual and any other documents directing the internal 
administration of the agency impacting the delivery of services). 
64 Id. (stating, “We had to change the game.”). 
65 See Deloria, supra note 55, at 156-163; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 
391-396; see further, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding 
that treaty clauses, Indian commerce clause, and the general structure of 
Constitution are sufficient grounds for upholding the “plenary and exclusive” 
power of Congress over the tribes). 
66 Survey of Conditions, supra note 42, at 227-301. 
67 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1902). 
 has been partially rehabilitated as a holding defending the trust responsibility 
between the federal government and the tribes in post-termination era court 
holdings.  
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States federal laws work for them. When the National Congress of 
American Indians released the Declaration of Indian Purpose in 
1961, tribal advocates reached out to the Kennedy Administration 
with an innovative idea: use the government contracting process as 
a mechanism for transferring control of federal funds from the 
federal agencies to the tribes.68 They essentially argued for a block 
grant program at least six years before the first national block grant 
program—the Partnership for Health program of 1966—was 
instituted.69 The Kennedy Administration was intrigued enough to 
support a few demonstration projects through the BIA under the Buy 
Indian Act, which began a series of limited procurement contracts to 
tribal organizations.70  
These demonstration projects then grew into a new series of self-
governance demonstration projects under the Johnson 
Administration that allowed the Navajo Nation and other large tribes 
to begin taking over education on their reservations. By the time 
President Nixon addressed Congress in 1970 and called for a pivot 
away from the termination and relocation policies, tribes had been 
running a series of successful self-governance contracts through 
these demonstration projects.71 When Forrest Gerrard, legal counsel 
to Senator Jackson, began to push the senator to develop a federal 
plan that would open the way for self-governance 
contracting/compacting for all tribes, the foundation had already 
been well-established.72  
 
                                                                                                             
68 Telephone Interview with Eric Eberhard, Professor of Federal Indian Law at 
the University of Washington School of Law and former legal counsel to the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Nov. 11, 2015).  
69 Id. 
70 See THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND 
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, 1961-1969 (2001). These demonstration projects 
were also the first instances of tribal organizations wherein two or more tribes 
form a non-profit (generally, though not always) to administer services across a 
broader region that a single tribal territory. An example of a contemporary tribal 
organization would be the California Rural Indian Health Board (CRIHB) which 
provides health services for members of federally-recognized tribes in 
California. CRIHB is the main tribal contracting organ for the Californian tribes. 
The tribal organization allows the tribes to pool their 638 funds into a larger 
financial base for health programs across California. 
71 Id. 
72 Forrest Gerrard was legal counsel to Senator Scoop Jackson, the chairman of 
the Select Committee on Indian Affairs throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Mr. 
Gerrard was one of the principle architects of the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975 as well as a number of other pieces of Indian 
Legislation. Eberhard, supra note 68; see also, Trahant, supra note 53. 
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B. ISDEAA and the BIA & IHS Response: Problems with the 
Procurement Contracts Frame 
 
The initial passage of the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act in 1975 was met with resistance from both 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service.73 The 
BIA responded to tribal requests for contract negotiations with a sea 
of red tape that effectively halted the self-governance ambitions of 
all but the most determined of tribes—or those with the finances to 
hire lawyers.74 The Indian Health Service insisted that ISDEAA 
contracts could not possibly apply to tribes and refused to even 
entertain the concept of tribal contracting/compacting.75 With the 
federal agencies using the mechanisms of administrative law to 
effectively gut the ISDEAA, tribal leaders went back to Congress.76  
The prior history of the Kennedy and Johnson Administration 
demonstration programs presented an unexpected problem for tribal 
governments, namely that the procurement contracts framework 
gave significant leverage to federal agencies during the negotiations 
process.77 If tribal self-governance contracts were conceptualized as 
procurement contracts, then the BIA had significant control over 
negotiations, the contract scope, reporting requirements, and even 
the tribes with whom the agency would enter contracts. Neither the 
BIA nor IHS were malicious in their initial interpretation of the 
ISDEAA; they were merely following a legal framework that had 
already been set during the previous administrations and did not 
appear to be overturned by the ISDEAA.78 The fact that government 
procurement contracts happened to provide a great deal of leverage 
                                                                                                             
73 Comm'r Ind. Aff., Ann. Rep., supra note 48. 
74 Eberhard, supra note 68; Recommendations for Strengthening the Indian Self-
Determination Act, Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th 
Cong. (1987) (the difficulty of obtaining permissions was a running theme 
throughout tribal testimony). 
75  Eberhard, supra note 68. 
76 The agencies relied upon administrative law around procurement contracts to 
refuse, unilaterally change, or end tribal self-governance 
contracting/compacting. They also refused to enter into any form of negotiated 
rule-making on the implementation and provisions of ISDEAA. This left the 
tribes in the familiar, and upsetting, territory of having to guess at the inner 
workings of the BIA and IHS as they could not access the internal handbooks 
supposedly governing agency behavior.  
77 Geoffry Strommer & Stephen Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of 
Tribal Self-Governance under ISDEAA, 39 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 16-18 
(2014). 
78 Id. at 20-22. 
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and discretion to federal agencies during contracting was just a 
happy accident. However, it did place tribal self-governance 
contracting in a framework that still put federal agencies in the 
position of dictating tribal policies—they just did it via contract 
riders, reporting requirements, and a refusal to pay contract support 
costs instead of agency mandates and oversight.79     
 
C. Procurement to Block Grants: Changing the Government 
Contracting Frame 
 
Tribal leaders successfully convinced Congress to pass a series 
of strengthening amendments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The 
first was the 1984 Amendments, Public Law 98-250, which 
exempted tribal self-governance contracting/compacting from the 
Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act (Pub. L. 98-250).80 
Public Law 98-250 also limited the ability of federal agencies to 
force tribes to accept onerous reporting requirements.81 The 1984 
Amendments, while deeply technical and on the surface focused on 
the fine details of the contracting procedure, set the tone for further 
amendments to ISDEAA. Rather than focus upon sweeping theories 
of tribal self-determination, Congress focused upon specific 
language fixes to ISDEAA that had, in practice, the effect of 
transferring greater control over the entire contracting process into 
tribal rather than agency hands.82  
The 1988 Amendments significantly expanded the scope of 
ISDEAA, directed the BIA and IHS to open all bureaus and 
divisions to tribal self-governance contracting, and removed the 
                                                                                                             
79 Eberhard, supra note 68; Senator Inouye specifically highlighted the 
“agencies’ consistent failures over the past decade to administer self-
determination contracts in conformity with the law,” in particularly the agencies’ 
failures to cede control to the tribes. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 37 (1987), as 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 2620, 2656; See also, U.S. Gov’t Accounting 
Office, Still No Progress In Implementing Controls Over Contracts and Grants 
with Indians, GAO-116394 (1981) (critiquing BIA failure to take GAO 
recommended action from 1978 to provide necessary measures to turn over 
agency functions to the tribes and ensure their smooth transition and operation). 
80 See H. REP. No. 98-1071 (1984) (explaining the goals and intention of the 
amendments). 
81 Id. 
82 See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 77 at 29; see further, S. Bobo Dean, 
Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal Self-
Determination, 36 TULSA L.J. 349, 350 (2000) (outlining the series of major 
amendments to ISEAA). 
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agency's ability to insert contract riders asserting agency control.83 
Tribal leadership argued before Congress that the federal agencies 
manipulated administrative law to avoid paying full contract support 
costs and otherwise backed negotiated tribes into untenable 
contracts.84 Philip Martin, Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians noted that:  
 
Right now, the Federal Government and the tribal 
governments are fighting for the same money that is 
appropriated for them. So, there is a big conflict of 
interest on the part of the BIA in carrying out the 
Indian Self-Determination Act. We have had nothing 
but problems the last 6 years with the BIA and IHS 
in particular about indirect costs. So, I hope that 
through these hearings some real amendments can be 
made to make sure that the rights of the tribes to 
contract and the rights of the tribe to receive adequate 
administrative costs to conduct these programs be 
given to the tribes, and that it is done in law so that 
there can be no mistake about it, rather than just 
putting these things vaguely into law, because the 
BIA and the IHS are very good at twisting words 
around to their own advantage.85  
 
Mr. Martin's critique of BIA and IHS administrative policy was not 
unique, nor was it the first time tribal leaders reported the federal 
agencies using administrative law to throw up roadblocks to tribal 
contracts.86 Congress responded by initiating the self-determination 
                                                                                                             
83 Id.; see further Amending the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act to Provide further Self-Governance by Indian Tribes, S. REP. NO. 
108-413, 108th Cong. (2003-2004). 
84 25 U.S.C. § 450(m) (1984); 25 C.F.R §§ 900.240-245 (1986) (allowing federal 
agencies to rescind a contract in whole or in part. Prior to the 1994 
Amendments, this provision was left vague. BIA and IHS interpreted this 
provision very broadly while at the same time interpreting funding provisions 
quite narrowly, resulting in burdensome, underfunding contracts that set up 
tribes to fail. The refusal of the agencies to pay full contract support costs is an 
ongoing issue.). 
85 Recommendations for Strengthening the Indian Self-Determination Act: 
Hearing before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong, 100-250 (1987). 
86 Id. at 26-28 (Mr. Red Owl, planning director of Sissheton-Wahpeton Sioux 
Tribe, further reported that the federal agencies successfully used administrative 
law to ensure that of every dollar of Congressional funding 85 cents stayed with 
the agencies and 15 cents went to the tribes. He pointed to complexity of 
procurement contracting—particularly when applied to the tribes—as part of the 
issue. Mr. Martin, responding to a question from Chairman Inouye regarding 
agency delays in processing tribal contract proposals further stated that: “In my 
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demonstration program which directed the agencies to select 20 
tribes to enter into self-determination compacts.87 These compacts 
allowed tribes to not only assume control over federal programs, but 
also allowed the tribes to restructure, shift finances, and re-organize 
the priorities for those programs for which they compacted.88 These 
self-determination compacts were far more in-line with tribal 
expectations of self-governance contracting and met with significant 
tribal interest.89  Between limiting the administrative power of the 
agencies and developing the self-determination compacting 
demonstration projects, Congress sent strong signals that it was 
inclined to think of tribal self-governance contracts in broad terms. 
The 1988 Amendments pushed ISDEAA contracting to look more 
like modern Medicaid State Block Grants rather than limited 
government procurement contracts.  
At this time, Congress was ready to rethink the relationship 
between the federal agencies and the tribes along these lines as they 
were in the process of radically reforming the majority of the legal 
framework around social welfare programs to transition planning 
and authority from the federal agencies to the states themselves.90 
Tribal advocates used the larger national debate around the scope of 
federal authority to argue that the expansion of tribal self-
governance contracts was a logical extension of the general 
limitations being placed on federal power. Tribal advocates further 
argued that the BIA and IHS, in contradiction to the Supreme Court 
decision in Morton v. Ruiz and its descendants, relied upon internal 
agency regulations that were not accessible by tribal governments. 
                                                                                                             
judgment, one of the reasons why we have so many problems with contracts 
with both agencies, BIA and IHS, is because they really don't have a contracting 
management system in place. It's not a priority with them to be contracting with 
tribes. So, when we make our proposals, they take their good old time. There is 
no requirement, hardly, when they have to respond. There is no penalty in case 
they don't carry out their agreement; there is no penalty on them.”). 
87 Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No 100-472, § 209, 
102 Stat. 2289, 2296-98 (Codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (1988)), repealed by 
Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260 § 10, Stat. 
711, 734.  
88  See M. Brent Leonhard, TRIBAL CONTRACTING: UNDERSTANDING AND 
DRAFTING BUSINESS CONTRACTS WITH AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES AT 43-
45(2009) (explaining the federal statutes allowing for the shifting of tribal 
finances); see also Strommer & Osborne, supra note 77. 
89 See Comm'r Ind. Aff. supra note 48. 
90  Eberhard, supra note 68; see further, S. REP. NO. 103-374 at 2 (1994) 
(describing the 1988 amendments as necessary for dealing with the “excessive 
bureaucracy” constraining tribal self-governance). 
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The tribes advocated for a clarified contracting process that removed 
the cloud of hidden bureaucratic rules to which they were not part 
of making nor could even effectively refer.91 Congress agreed and, 
as part of the 1988 amendments, directed the BIA and IHS to work 
together through the new self-determination demonstration 
programs to find a less burdensome contracting process.92 
At first, the BIA and IHS worked closely with the tribes that they 
identified to be “key stakeholders” in a preliminary negotiated 
rulemaking process and developed a draft rule in late 1990.93 From 
1990 until 1994, the two agencies continued to work on the final rule 
without tribal consultation—this proved to be a mistake as tribal 
reaction to the presented rule, when it was revealed via the Federal 
Register, was overwhelmingly critical.94 During Congressional 
oversight hearings, tribal advocates and leaders pointed to a two 
year gap in any form of tribal consultation as evidence of BIA and 
IHS unwillingness to consider seriously the self-governance rights 
of tribal governments.95 Congress again agreed and amended 
ISDEAA in 1994. As part of the 1994 amendments, Congress 
directed the BIA and IHS to enter into negotiated rule-making with 
the tribes pursuant to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 
Public Law 101-648.96 Congress further reiterated its determination 
to support tribal self-governance and self-determination through the 
contracting process—a process it desired to be unencumbered by 
                                                                                                             
91  See S. REP. NO. 100-274; see further, Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, 
Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 
CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1995). 
92 S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 2 (1987); Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act: Hearing on Public Law 93-638 Before the Committee on Indian 
Affairs, 100th Cong. at 2, 26-28 (1987). 
93 Pub L. 93-638, Proposed Final Rule 1990, Findings. Interestingly the BIA and 
IHS were among the first agencies to attempt a limited form of negotiated rule-
making under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-648 despite 
their later hostility to any further negotiated rulemaking process. 
94 The proposed regulation was published for comment on January 20, 1994 at 
59 FR 3166. Almost every federally recognized tribe submitted criticism to the 
proposed rule, as did most trial organizations. Tribal response to the proposed 
rule ran over 80 pages in the federal register. There were very few, if any, 
positive comments about the proposed rule anywhere in the 80 pages of 
response. 
95 As point of interest, every single tribe and tribal organization that had a 638 
contract as of 1994 submitted a comment to the Federal Register in response to 
the proposed rule. None of them were positive in their assessment. 59 FR 3166 
(Jan. 20, 1994). 
96 S. REP. NO. 100-274 at 20; Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 
1994, § 104(d) (1994). 
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agency bureaucracy.97  
The 1995-1996 negotiated rule-making on ISDEAA was one of 
the defining moments not just for tribal self-governance contracting, 
but also for the development of modern federal Indian law. It was 
the first time the federal agencies entered into a negotiation process 
in which they had to find a “unanimous concurrence among the 
interests represented unless the committee agrees to define such 
term to mean general but not unanimous concurrence,” rather than 
making administrative rules unilaterally and then applying them to 
the tribes.98 Tribes used the 1995-1996 negotiated rulemaking 
process to address longstanding grievances with federal agency 
treatment of tribal self-governance, and while most of those 
concerns were set aside as outside the jurisdiction of the rulemaking 
process, the Federal Register report reflected a deep current of 
distrust.  
 
Tribal representatives also indicated a concern that 
absent formal rulemaking, Federal agencies might 
use internal procedures to circumvent the policies 
underlying the Act, thwarting the intent to simplify 
the contracting process and free Indian tribes from 
excessive Federal control. Two comments suggested 
that negotiating rulemaking procedures will ensure 
that Federal agencies would be bound to follow 
uniform procedures to implement and interpret the 
Act and regulations. Two other comments wanted the 
regulation to state explicitly that the Secretaries lack 
authority to interpret the meaning or application of 
any provision of the Act or the regulations. Tribal 
representatives feared that a myriad of letters 
containing policy statements and correspondence 
interpreting reporting requirements would result if 
internal agency procedures are not tied to formal 
rulemaking.99 
 
Comments recorded within the federal register reflect tribal 
concerns regarding administrative burdens, resistant agencies, 
indirect costs, and the ability to shape administrative rules—but 
                                                                                                             
97 Congressional Findings, Indian Self-Determination Act of 1988 Public Law 
93-638. 
98 59 Fed. Reg. 243, 249 (Dec. 29, 1994). 
99 61 Fed. Reg. 122-32482 (Jan. 3, 1996). 
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contained few appeals to tribal sovereignty.100 Tribal focus during 
the 1995-1996 negotiated rulemaking process was on the 
contracting process itself and wrestling as much control as possible 
from the federal agencies. Tribal advocates used the canons of 
contract law and theories of tribal self-governance, as articulated by 
Congress, to whittle away at agency authority and jurisdiction. That 
steady approach of using government contracts law to wrestle 
control of funds, lands, and programs back to tribal governments 
continues to guide tribal advocacy on ISDEAA amendments.101 
 
D. The Current Form of 638 Contracting/Compacting: 
Ongoing Problems 
 
Currently 638 contracting/compacting comes in two forms: Title 
I self-governance contracting and Title V self-determination 
compacting. Title I contracting is the foundation of ISDEAA and has 
been the primary mechanism of tribal self-governance contracting 
since 1975. While the process has been simplified multiple times as 
described above, Title I contracting is still more restrictive than Title 
V compacting.  
Title I self-governance contracts are the most highly structured, 
rigid mechanism for tribes to take over a federal program, and often, 
the most onerous to conduct. In a Title I contract, a tribe must submit 
yearly audits pursuant to the Single Agency Audit Act of 1984 as 
well as submit to performance monitoring by the contracting 
agency.102 Title I self-governance contracts are open to any federally 
recognized tribe or tribal organization for any federal program or 
service provided for the benefit of AI/AN tribes or individuals.103 
                                                                                                             
100 Id.  
101 Congress has continued to amend ISDEAA to clarify tribal self-governance 
contracting and increase tribal control over their 638 contracts. See AMENDING 
THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT TO 
PROVIDE FURTHER SELF-GOVERNANCE BY INDIAN TRIBES, S. REP. NO. 108-413 
(108th Cong. 2004); see further, Pub. L. 106-260 Indian Self-Determination Act 
Amendments of 2000. 
102 25 U.S.C. § 450l(c) (2017), 25 C.F.R. § 900.65 (2013); 25 U.S.C. §§ 
450l(c)(b)(7)(C) (2013). 
103 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1) (2017), 25 C.F.R. § 900.8 (2013) (while tribes have 
attempted to initiate 638 contracts outside of the BIA and IHS for services 
provided by Community Health Centers and other services they have thus far 
been unsuccessful. ISDEAA and modern Indian statutes specifically recognize 
tribal organizations—where two or more tribes enter into a contract or compact 
for purposes of administering a 638 contract/compact to their combined 
populations.). 
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Tribes and tribal organizations that wish to enter into a Title I self-
governance contract must send a proposal to the federal agency to 
initiate negotiations. Funds under Title I contracts cannot be moved 
to other programs, nor can the structure of the contract be changed 
without a renegotiation. 
Alternatively, Title V self-determination compacts are much 
more flexible. Only tribes or tribal organizations that have 
maintained a successful Title I contract for three years without 
problems in their yearly audits are eligible to enter into a Title V 
compact.104 Understandably, after almost fifty years of tribal self-
governance contracting, nearly all tribes and tribal organizations that 
desire to enter into tribal self-governance contracting have done 
so.105 Under a Title V compact, a tribe may redesign or combine 
compacts, reallocate or redirect funding, and restructure priorities 
without seeking prior approval from the funding agency.106 Federal 
agencies may only re-assume a Title V compact if (1) clear evidence 
of gross mismanagement of funds transferred to the tribe or tribal 
organization exist, or (2) if (a) a clear finding of imminent 
endangerment of public health exist caused by an act or omission by 
the tribe or tribal organization and (b) such endangerment arises out 
of a failure to carry out the compact.107  
Title V of the ISDEAA provides the greatest amount of 
flexibility, independence, and control to a tribal organization as is 
possible under the framework of government contracting. While 
there are still limitations upon the abilities of the tribes to use 
contracting funds as they see fit, Title V compacting provides the 
best mechanism for tribes to take control of federal funds and use 
those funds to govern themselves. Moreover, Title V compacting 
allows a tribe or tribal organization to combine their own funds with 
the compact without causing accounting issues or potentially having 
those funds seized by the federal government should the 
contracting/compacting agency re-assume the contract/compact.108  
Of the problems that continue to haunt the implementation of the 
ISDEAA, the failure of federal agencies to pay full contract support 
costs is the one most frequently raised by tribes and tribal 
                                                                                                             
104 25 U.S.C. § 458 aaa-2 (2017), 42 C.F.R. §§ 137.15-23 (2013). 
105 Now Title I contracting is largely used by new tribal organizations formed by 
two or more tribes who wish to enter into a shared 638 contract.  
106 25 U.S.C. §§ 458 aaa-6(b)-(d) (2017), 43 C.F.T. §§ 137&131-150 (2013). 
107 25 U.S.C. §§ 458 aaa-4 & 458 aaa-5(e) (2017), 42 C.F.R. 137.285 (2013). 
108 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-2(e) (2017); 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4(b) (2013).  
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organizations.109 Failure to pay full contract support costs threatens 
the integrity of both Title I contracting and Title V compacting 
because the tribes do not have the same resources to support the 
administrative requirements for programs, but those fees are rarely 
addressed, nor can they be easily addressed in a self-governance 
contract/compact. Some tribes either chose not to engage in 638 
contracts/compacts because of the uncertainty around contract 
support costs, or chose to engage in 638 programs selectively based 
upon the types of administrative costs the tribe could bear.110 For 
this reason, both the BIA and the IHS have tribes which are labeled 
“direct service” or “self-governance.” In theory, this division is 
internal to the agencies, and used to mark which departments handle 
those tribal affairs. In practice, this division has often been used by 
both federal agencies as a mechanism for determining funding 
allocations.111 Thus, it has given rise to a misunderstanding of intra-
tribal politics where an illusion of conflict exists between “direct 
service” tribes and “self-governance” tribes on theories of 
sovereignty.  
In practice, nearly all tribes have entered into Title I or Title V 
self-governance contracts/compacts; thus, all tribes are “self-
governance” tribes. However, tribes strategically chose which 
programs and services to 638 based on tribal priorities and capacity. 
Those programs which a tribe elects to let remain with the federal 
agencies are thus “direct service” programs. Therefore, all tribes 
who have not 638-ed every federal program or service provided are 
                                                                                                             
109 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 412 (2016) 
(holding that the tribe has 6 years from the time a claim for self-determination 
contract support costs initially arises to present such claim to a federal agency 
owing such reimbursement. Further holding that a tribe cannot rely upon 
equitable tolling to extend the time period unless such claims have been 1) 
diligently pursued, and 2) there are extraordinary circumstances beyond the 
tribe’s control preventing such timely presentation). 
110 For example, Cherokee Nation has engaged in a long-term, strategic process 
of 638 sections of the health care system providing health services to tribal 
members both on and off the reservation. Much of tribal financial planning 
revolves around decisions on where and when to 638 a program. See 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, FY 2016, Cherokee Nation Financial 
Resources Group, available at 
http://www.cherokee.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rj1lgepEeRY%3d&tabid=52
87&portalid=0&mid=5724. 
111 See Dep’t of Health & Human Services Indian Health Service, Justification 
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“direct service” tribes; consequently, all tribes are also “direct 
service” tribes.112 The ability to freely choose whether or not to enter 
into a self-governance contract is fundamental to the self-
determination of tribal governments. Casting the division between 
tribes that entered into a 638 contract versus a tribe that has not as a 
fundamental difference on issues of tribal governance or tribal 
sovereignty oversimplifies the political reality in which tribes find 
themselves.  
 
E. The Choice to 638: Moments of Tribal Self-Determination 
 
As noted above, the decision to 638 a program is a complex one. 
A tribe may choose to 638 a part of a program—for example: a tribe 
may (1) take over a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program while 
keeping the inpatient hospital under IHS direct control; (2) choose 
to enter into a regional consortium with other tribes and together 
enter into a 638 compact/contract; or, (3) choose to 638 an entire 
facility and its administration. A tribe may also elect not to 638 any 
part of a program/service provided by a federal agency due to 
administrative concerns. Each of these decisions are instances of 
tribes exercising their self-governance rights and arguably a moment 
of tribal sovereignty. However, the ISDEAA itself is not, and was 
not, conceptualized as a mechanism of tribal sovereignty, but rather 
one of protecting tribal self-governance via contracting.  
Some of the confusion in the intent—and the legal doctrine that 
ought to apply to ISDEAA—comes from the wealth of legislation 
on Indian affairs that occurred from 1968 to 1977. Congress was 
extremely active on Indian issues as it attempted to reverse the 
devastation caused by termination and relocation era policies.113 The 
courts have similarly actively been attempting to incorporate this 
wealth of legislation into the broader legal framework of federal 
Indian law and have developed a legal understanding of ISDEAA 
that separates 638 contracting/compacting from other legal 
doctrines concerning American Indians and Alaska Natives.114  
                                                                                                             
112 But see, The President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget for Native Programs, 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (Mar. 19, 2013). 
113 See Pevar, supra note 18 at 1-17 (2012); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 
at 93-108. 
114 One way of reading the Ramah line of cases is the Court’s attempt to square 
hermeneutic circle of promoting tribal self-determination, as demanded by 
ISDEAA, with the sheer amount of control granted to the federal agencies 
through the framework of government contracting. Contract support costs seem 
339 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 5:308 
 
    
 
IV. 638 CONTRACTING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 
As discussed in Section II of this article, the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty within federal statute and case law is unclear, muddied 
by the fragmentary nature of federal Indian policy, and challenged 
by conflicting doctrines (like the plenary power doctrine). It is 
unsurprising that tribal sovereignty, as a doctrine within United 
States federal law, should be such a conflicted legal theory. As a 
legal doctrine, tribal sovereignty essentially asks the courts to 
protect, through the mechanisms of United States federal law, a right 
which exists outside of the jurisdiction of the courts. If Congress 
wishes to follow the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, then it must 
reserve jurisdiction of issues—power—to the tribes themselves and 
thus remove decision-making power from both itself and the states. 
To a certain degree, Congress has demonstrated a willingness to do 
so through the recognition of the validity of tribal courts, tribal 
governments, and tribal legislation. However, that protection only 
extends to removing the jurisdiction of the states over tribal 
members and lands. Congress has never found Indian nations 
beyond its reach, nor has the Court been willing to rebuke Congress 
in the same fashion as it has rebuked states.115 The plenary powers 
doctrine, thus far, has been a legal doctrine that overwhelms any 
theory of tribal sovereignty when the two come into conflict. 
The case law on tribal sovereignty is further complicated by the 
trust doctrine—which asserts a special relationship between the 
federal government and the tribes based on the continuing protection 
of tribal interests by the United States federal government—as that 
                                                                                                             
a random fight except when put in the context of both the economic necessity of 
recouping those costs for the tribes and pushing back against federal control. See 
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182 (2012); see further, Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 412 (2016).   
115 Tribes at different points in time have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to strike 
down or otherwise limit Congressional trespass on the sovereignty of Indian 
nations. In each instance, the Court has upheld the ability of Congress—though 
not always federal agencies—to interfere with tribal governance as it sees fit. 
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that commerce, 
treaty clauses, and structure of Constitution are the basis for “plenary and 
exclusive” power of Congress); see further, Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 556-558.; see 
also, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Antoine v 
Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); see further, WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE 
COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE TEN WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER 
DECIDED 19 (2010) (discussing the fundamental point of dissonance in asking 
the Western legal system to protect the sovereignty rights of tribes). 
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doctrine places tribal governments in an inherently weaker 
position.116 The trust doctrine has evolved considerably from the 
Cherokee line of cases where the United States Supreme Court first 
articulated it, but it remains one of the main pillars supporting tribal 
sovereignty within federal Indian case-law. The fundamental theory 
behind the trust responsibility is that the United States federal 
government has taken upon itself “moral obligations of the highest 
responsibility and trust” towards American Indians and Alaska 
Natives, and that the “fulfillment of which the national honor has 
been committed.”117 The trust responsibility has been used to justify 
almost every shift in federal Indian policy, including termination, as 
the standard for meeting the trust responsibility is extremely 
flexible.  
In modern case law, however, tribal advocates have used the 
trust responsibility to support three major claims. First, the 
preservation of tribal lands by entering lands 'into trust' such that 
they become part of Indian Country; second, the continued federal 
funding of Indian programs; and finally, the government-to-
government relationship between the United States federal 
government and the tribes.118 The vagueness of the trust doctrine is 
such that it provides useful ground for, not only tribal advocates, but 
also their opponents. Courts have provided few standards for 
determining whether or not a federal policy is in violation of the trust 
responsibility, but they have consistently found that the federal 
                                                                                                             
116 See supra note 23 for a brief discussion the Marshall Court's introduction of 
the trust responsibility of the U.S. towards Indian nations. The trust doctrine is 
an extremely complex legal doctrine within federal Indian law and a detailed 
discussion of that doctrine goes beyond the scope of this paper. See e.g., 
Rebecca Tsosie, The Indian Trust Doctrine After the 2002-2003 Supreme Court 
Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (2003); Mary C. Wood, Indian Land and the 
Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. 
REV. 1471 (1994). 
117 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); see also, United States v. 
Navajo Nation, 538 U.S. 488, 490 (2003) (finding a “general trust relationship” 
between the federal gov’t and Indian tribes in which the federal gov’t must 
move to protect Indian interests). 
118 Entering lands into trust is one of the primary methods tribes have of 
expanding their territories and thus jurisdiction. Lands in trust have limitations 
upon them as the tribes cannot sell them or enter into certain property 
arrangements without the permission of the Secretary of the Interior. However, 
placing lands in trust is still one of the best ways to ensure tribal jurisdiction 
over those lands. This process has unfortunately been complicated by recent 
Supreme Court rulings and tribes are currently seeking a legislative fix from 
Congress. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 380 (2009). 
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government has a general fiduciary duty to the tribes.119 Tribal 
advocates have also successfully used the trust doctrine to obtain 
legal remedies from the courts on violation of resource rights,120 
proper management of income held in federal accounts,121 and tribal 
sovereignty in general.122 On the other hand, the trust doctrine has 
also used to limit tribal sovereignty and justify the termination era 
policies.123 Moreover, locating tribal sovereignty within the trust 
doctrine places tribal governments in an inherently subservient 
position, a hierarchy of power that has been resisted by tribal 
advocates.124 
Despite the legislative and judicial assaults upon tribal 
sovereignty and its tenuous position within case law, tribal 
advocates have not stopped arguing for the recognition of the full 
and substantive sovereignty of Indian tribes; however, they have 
also diversified their legal strategies as demonstrated throughout this 
article. A century of facing the steady erosion of tribal sovereignty, 
self-governance rights, and control within the American legal 
system led tribal leaders to reach outside the traditional legal 
doctrines governing federal Indian law to look for innovative 
protections.125 Tribal leaders have been effective navigators of both 
the American legal and American political system in the defense of 
their people, lands, and authority by manipulating whatever legal 
doctrine possible to advance tribal interests. Thus, it is in keeping 
with the adaptability of tribal advocates that they developed a theory 
of tribal contracting within the larger body of government 
contracting law in order to best protect tribal rights to self-
determination.  
It is not a mistake or misreading of the ISDEAA to approach 
                                                                                                             
119 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (holding that applicable 
statutes, regulations, treaties, and executive orders “define the contours of the 
U.S. fiduciary responsibilities” to the tribes under the trust doctrine); see further, 
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 736-738 (2011); 
Rodgers v. United States, 697 Fed 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1983). 
120 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 537 U.S. 465, 468 (2003) 
(protecting tribal land interest); see also Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 541 
(9th Cir. 1995) (protecting tribal water rights); United States v. Eberhardt, 789 
F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding the trust responsibility required the 
federal gov’t to protect tribal fishing interest).  
121 See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Loudner v. 
United States, 108 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir 1997). 
122 Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
123 Survey of Conditions, supra note 42. 
124 See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 115; see further, Deloria, supra note 55. 
125 See Pevar, supra note 18. 
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638-contracting from within the framework of government 
contracting because that was the original intent of tribal advocates 
in designing the legislation, as demonstrated in section three. The 
Supreme Court, thus far, has resolved ISDEAA 
contracting/compacting cases under theories of contract without 
reaching for legal doctrines related to federal Indian policy.126 In 
doing this, the Supreme Court has followed arguments made by 
tribal advocates on ISDEAA.127 638 contracting/compacting is a 
fundamental part of tribal self-determination, a federal policy which 
the courts have upheld, but remains separate from tribal sovereignty, 
which the courts have encumbered.  
By arguing from within the framework of government 
contracting and through the modern congressional policy of self-
determination, tribal advocates have been able to win back 
significant sectors of tribal control, free from the oversight of the 
federal agencies.128 The President of the National Congress of 
American Indians, Jefferson Keel, stated that the policy of self-
determination has been an enormous success.129 However, President 
Keel was careful to delineate the tribal theory of Indian 
sovereignty—which is a full and substantive sovereignty that is not 
minimized by the plenary powers doctrine—from that of self-
determination as possible under ISDEAA.130 Tribal advocates 
understand the speed at which legal doctrines regarding Indian 
rights can turn against them and have been careful to maintain the 
government contracting frame around 638 contracting/compacting 
as demonstrated by their careful approach to the 1988, 1996, and 
2000 amendments to ISDEAA. 
Even without tribal advocates consistently working to maintain 
                                                                                                             
126 Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 187 (2012) (finding under 
government contracting provisions that the federal agencies must pay tribal 
governments and tribal organizations full contract support costs regardless of 
funds appropriated by Congress). 
127 See Testimony of Mr. Red Owl, supra note 86 at 21-22. 
128 See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 634 (2005) (in 
general, ISDEAA has been given a broad and liberal interpretation by the courts 
with regard to what tribes can contract for and in limiting the scope of federal 
agency interference); see also, Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.2d 1455, 
1456 (10th Cir 1997); Ramah Navajo School Board v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 
1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
129 Jefferson Keel, Op-ed., Sovereignty & Trust Responsibility-40 years of Tribal 
Self-Determination, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 10, 2010), 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/keel-sovereignty-and-the-trust-
responsibility-40-years-of-tribal-self-determination/. 
130 Id.  
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the government contracting frame,131 638 contracting/compacting 
falls outside the doctrine of tribal sovereignty because it works 
under the theory of Congressional delegation.132 Through ISDEAA, 
Congress essentially delegated back to the tribe the provision of 
services owed to them under the doctrine of the trust 
responsibility.133 ISDEAA does not recognize tribal sovereignty, but 
instead, the United States’ obligations to the tribes for services 
guaranteed to them under treaty. 638 contracting/compacting 
ensures that tribes maximize their control over how those services 
are provided to them.134 Federal Indian policy has managed to divide 
self-determination and self-governance from sovereignty when it 
comes to the tribes. ISDEAA empowers the tribes regarding their 
self-governance, but it does not strengthen their sovereignty because 
the legal mechanisms providing that empowerment all flow from 
doctrines related to federal responsibilities to the tribes. While the 
courts have found that the federal government has a substantial 
interest in empowering tribal self-sufficiency, self-governance, and 
economic development,135 they have thus far not found that the 
federal government has a similar interest in promoting tribal 
sovereignty.136 The fact that 638 contracting/compacting language 
revolves around self-determination and self-governance rather than 




The courts have not erred by resolving issues arising out of 
ISDEAA through contract law, nor has Congress erred in treating 
ISDEAA as a mechanism of tribal self-determination, but not tribal 
sovereignty. Indeed, tribal advocates have been adamant before the 
courts and Congress that what tribes desire from ISDEAA is that 
they are to be treated as contractors with the full rights and 
protections normally. Tribal advocates have shifted the 
Congressional vision of the full scope of 638 
                                                                                                             
131 See Ramah, 567 U.S. at10-11. 
132 Supra note 17.  
133 Id. 
134 See Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631. 
135 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987). 
136 One could argue that the courts have not even found that the federal gov’t 
must be respectful of tribal sovereignty, only the states, as the courts have used 
both the plenary power doctrine and the preemption doctrine to shut down state 
attempts to legislate on tribal lands. 
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contracting/compacting, as detailed in section three, but have not 
moved away from that general frame because it provides another 
avenue for protecting tribal interests without necessarily invoking 
Indian law doctrines that may be problematic. The government 
contracting frame has its own problems, as demonstrated by the 
ongoing conflict over contract support costs, but those issues are 
new to the debates around federal Indian policy for the tribes. The 
government contracting frame provides new ground to visit old 
problems. Thus, under ISDEAA, the issues regarding interference 
from federal agencies, the full funding of Indian programs, and the 
empowerment of tribal self-governance can be approached from 
new angles. Fighting the paternalism of federal agencies is an old 
battle for the tribes, but under ISDEAA, it becomes a new discussion 
that has provided significantly better remedies than previous 
attempts to reclaim tribal self-governance. 
Approaching ISDEAA from the perspective that it either (1) 
reduces the tribes to government contractors, or (2) is somehow a 
mechanism of tribal sovereignty ignores the deliberate strategy on 
the part of tribal leaders and advocates to manipulate the 
government contracting frame. It is sometimes difficult to discern 
the legal and legislative strategies of the tribes, but in the drafting 
and evolution of ISDEAA, the choice by tribal leaders to build upon 
the government contracting framework in ISDEAA has been quite 
clear. The tribes have been active and aggressive actors in the 
evolution of 638 contracting/compacting, and innovative in its use. 
It is necessary to understand what has been the general strategy of 
the tribes towards ISDEAA if we are to understand how 638 
contracting/compacting will continue to develop. Since 1968, tribal 
advocates have steadily sought to increase the legal avenues 
available to them in order to expand and protect tribal self-
determination and control. Not all actions by the tribes should be 
considered within the frame of tribal sovereignty or seeking to 
expand tribal sovereignty because that ignores the innovations and 
adaptability of the tribes.  
Control has been the goal of tribal advocates since the 
termination and relocation era—control over (1) federal funding, (2) 
programs to American Indians and Alaska Natives, (3) tribal lands, 
and (4) tribal people. Another way of interpreting Vine Deloria's 
famous statement that “there might not be another” battle over the 
rights of tribes to have control over their own destiny could be that 
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the tribes will not allow control to be wrestled away from them in 
such a manner again. 638 contracting/compacting is not an act of 
tribal sovereignty—at least as the tribes themselves have understood 
their own sovereignty—but is demonstrably an act of tribal control. 
While the courts have been content to define tribal sovereignty as a 
footnote to the sovereignty of the United States, the tribes 
themselves have never stopped demanding full and substantial 
sovereignty over their own lands on par with the sovereignty of the 
United States. To conflate 638 contracting/compacting with tribal 
sovereignty is to turn a deaf ear to those demands.  
To understand ISDEAA as an expression of tribal sovereignty 
accepts the idea that the sovereignty of Indian nations is lesser than 
other nations, which is an idea the tribes have rejected time and time 
again. 638-ing is a hedge, a fail-safe, for tribes to maintain their self-
determination and self-governance rights while at the same time 
continuing to argue for their sovereignty rights. Further, conflating 
tribal self-governance contracting with tribal sovereignty obscures 
the depths of the tribal demand for sovereignty. ISDEAA has been 
enormously successful. Since its implementation, tribes have 
drastically increased their self-governance capacity, and by doing 
so, have increased their ability to make demands for the recognition 
of their sovereignty; regardless, the ISDEAA is not a mechanism of 
tribal sovereignty.  
 
